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INTRODUCTION 
 Steven Williams and Victim lived together for two years, separated in 
2015, then reconnected and started dating. After one date in 2016, Williams 
and his children joined Victim’s family at her house to spend the night.  
Sometime during the following hours, Victim discovered that Williams was 
cheating on her and, after she confronted him, Williams got angry when his 
phone ended up in the fish tank. Matters escalated, until Williams struck 
Victim, knocking her to the ground. He then repeatedly hit her in the jaw 
with his fist, fracturing both sides of her jaw, shattering a small piece of bone 
beyond repair, breaking teeth, and severing a facial nerve. And he did it in 
front of four children ranging in age from 8 to 15.  
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 Williams appealed his convictions for aggravated assault resulting in 
serious bodily injury and four counts of domestic violence in the presence of 
a child, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. First, he faults his 
counsel for not raising various objections to testimony from Victim’s treating 
physician. He claims that counsel should have insisted on the State 
establishing on the record that the physician was qualified under rule 702, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, to testify as an expert. But he does not show that no 
reasonable counsel would have foregone an objection where reasonable 
counsel could have concluded without a motion that the witness met the 
requirements, that requiring further rule 702 foundation would add to the 
witness’ credibility and persuasiveness, and that his testimony was 
potentially useful to the defense.  
 Williams faults counsel for not objecting when the State did not 
produce the physician’s curriculum vitae before trial. But he does not show 
that it was not produced, and reasonable counsel could have chosen to 
proceed without it. Moreover, an objection would only garner a continuance, 
and he does not show that it is reasonably likely to have resulted in a more 
favorable outcome. 
 Williams argues that counsel should have objected that the physician 
improperly testified about the ultimate issue—whether Williams assaulted 
-3- 
Victim. But reasonable counsel could have decided not to object because the 
physician did not purport to offer expert testimony that Victim was 
assaulted. Rather, he simply repeated the Victim’s report, made in the course 
of her diagnosis and treatment, that she was assaulted.  
 Finally, Williams argues that he was prejudiced because, he says, 
absent the physician’s testimony, the evidence was insufficient to convict 
him. But he does not establish that any or all of the doctor’s testimony would 
have been excluded had counsel objected. And he has not proved that any of 
the objections would have changed the evidentiary picture enough to make 
a more favorable outcome reasonably likely. 
 Second, Williams claims that his counsel should have objected to 
certain jury instructions. But he has not proved that counsel was ineffective 
for not doing so. The lesser-included-offense instruction for assault suffered 
no defect, and its wording did not prevent consideration or conviction of a 
class A misdemeanor. Further, this Court cannot presume prejudice, and 
submission of a class B misdemeanor assault instruction is not reasonably 
likely to have resulted in a more favorable outcome given the jury’s 
determination that Victim suffered serious bodily injury.  
 Williams also claims that a defect in the self-defense instruction 
allowed it to apply to the greater offenses but not to the lesser offenses. His 
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failure to argue prejudice defeats his claim. In any event, he could not 
establish any reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome with a 
different self-defense instruction because he does not contest the jury’s 
rejection of his self-defense claim on the greater offenses which rest on the 
same facts that applied to the lesser offenses, making a different outcome 
unlikely. 
 And Williams argues that counsel should have asked for a self-defense 
element in the instructions for both the greater and lesser-included offenses 
of domestic violence in the presence of a child. He does not argue prejudice, 
defeating his claim. Further, the jury’s rejection of self-defense for one charge 
(aggravated assault) renders his claimed error harmless for the other charges. 
Further, the instruction for aggravated assault and assault both included the 
self-defense requirement and, between them, formed the predicate domestic 
violence offense necessary for all of the charges of domestic violence in the 
presence of a child. Thus, the jury necessarily considered self-defense in 
addressing the predicate offenses, and the instructions, as a whole, properly 
informed the jury as to self-defense. 
 Third, Williams argues that his counsel should have made a hearsay 
objection to an investigating officer’s testimony about information gathered 
-5- 
at the crime scene. But reasonable counsel could have concluded that the 
testimony was not hearsay but was offered to explain the officer’s conduct.  
 Finally, Williams argues that his counsel should have objected to or 
moved to strike as improper character evidence his daughter’s description of 
him as manipulative. The witness said her written statement was inconsistent 
with her trial testimony because of Williams’s manipulation. But reasonable 
counsel could conclude that it was more beneficial to the defense to get the 
helpful statement in and to shift to Ex-Wife the “manipulative” label. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 Victim’s treating physician testified for the State at trial. Williams’s 
counsel sought the usual pre-trial discovery about the witness, including his 
curriculum vitae and reports, did not challenge the witness’ qualifications to 
testify, and used the witness to try to support defense theories. 
 1. Has Williams proved that counsel were ineffective where: 
 A. they did not insist that the State lay foundation for expert testimony 
under rule 702; 
 B. they did not object to the testimony on the ground that they 
purportedly did not receive his curriculum vitae;  
 C. they did not object when the physician repeated Victim’s statement 
that she was assaulted; and 
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 D. he has not proved either that (1) the omitted objections were 
reasonably likely to have succeeded, or (2) any or all of the objections would 
have changed the evidentiary picture enough to make a more favorable 
outcome reasonably likely? 
 2A. Has Williams proved that counsel were ineffective for not objecting 
to the misdemeanor assault instruction where the instruction properly 
defined a class A misdemeanor and was not reasonably likely to have 
influenced the trial’s outcome? 
 2B. Has Williams proved that counsel were ineffective for not objecting 
to a self-defense instruction for which he argues no prejudice and for which 
any error is harmless because all of the charges rest on the same facts and 
Williams concedes that the instruction properly applied to his aggravated 
assault conviction?  
 2C. Counsel submitted numerous related jury instructions involving 
domestic violence in the presence of a child that omitted reference to the 
State’s burden to disprove self-defense. But that factor was included in the 
elements instruction for the required predicate offenses of domestic violence. 
Has Williams proved that counsel were ineffective for omitting the self-
defense references in the related instructions? 
-7- 
 3A. Has Williams proved that counsel were ineffective for not raising 
a hearsay objection to testimony that reasonable counsel could conclude was 
offered not for the truth but to explain the witness’ conduct? 
 3B.  Has Williams proved that counsel were ineffective for not objecting 
to his daughter’s explanation that he “manipulated” what she put in her 
written statement where reasonable counsel could conclude that the defense 
could benefit more from getting the statement admitted and re-directing the 
“manipulative” label? 
 Standard of Review. “When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
raised for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review 
and we must decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective 
assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Parkinson, 2018 UT App 62, 
¶8, 427 P.3d 246 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 429 P.2d 462.  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of relevant facts. 
The domestic violence—Victim’s point of view 
 Within two months of meeting on a dating website, Defendant Steven 
Williams and Victim decided to live together, with Williams and his two 
children moving into the home Victim shared with her daughters and 
grandchildren. R533-35,909-10. Two years later, Williams and his children 
-8- 
moved out after Victim punched Williams for propositioning her eldest 
daughter. R535,573-74,611-12,617,910. Weeks later, in October 2015, the two 
were again dating and discussing marriage. R535-36,574.   
 About three months later, Williams took Victim home after going out 
to dinner, then retrieved his 12-year-old daughter D.D. so they could spend 
the night with Victim’s family.1 R540-43,575-76,643,669,797. Williams and 
Victim spent part of the next hour drinking mixed drinks and talking. R543-
45,578,644,673-74,687-88,692-93,788,799-800. During that time, Williams’s ex-
wife [Ex-Wife] dropped off their 14-year-old son D.S. and his 15-year-old 
friend [Friend], who settled in to play a game with D.D. in the living room. 
R542-43,576-77,609,616-20,638,644,673,786-88,795. When Victim’s 8-year-old 
granddaughter V.G.D. appeared in the kitchen, Williams took her back to her 
bedroom, leaving Victim and his phone in the kitchen. R546,816,1081.  
 A message appeared on Williams’s phone, and Victim opened it to 
discover that Williams had been secretly conversing with another woman. 
R546,621,579-82. She confronted him when he returned and accused him of 
cheating. R546,584-85. He, in turn, got mad that she had read his text and 
                                              
1 Because some of the minor witnesses have the same initials, the State 
refers to them by initials representing their relationship to Williams and 
Victim, i.e., D.D. for Defendant’s daughter, D.S. for Defendant’s son, and 
V.G.D. for Victim’s granddaughter.  
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demanded his phone back. R547,584. Victim refused to surrender it, he tried 
to grab it, and she tossed it away from him. R547-48,585-86,820. It accidentally 
landed in the fish tank, prompting Williams to grab and twist Victim’s arm 
so that she pivoted around, then he shoved her to the floor. R548-50,583,586-
89. Shocked, she refused his offer to help her up, got up herself, and noticed 
that V.G.D. was watching them. R550-52,590,820,825-26. Williams again 
returned V.G.D. to her room, and Victim went onto the back deck to try to 
contact the girl whose number she had taken from Williams’s phone. R552-
53,547,582-83. 
 Victim found the door locked when she tried to return to the kitchen, 
and D.S. had to let her in. R552-53. She walked past Williams on her way 
through the room and felt something hit her hard in the back of the head, 
causing her to stumble forward. R553-55. She turned and accused him of 
hitting her. R554. He responded by taunting her, repeatedly urging her to hit 
him. Id. She refused, calling him a “cheater[,]” at which point Williams “just 
popped” her in the jaw with his closed right fist. R555-56,820. She hit the 
ground and blacked out briefly. R557,593,677. When she came to, Williams 
was on top of her, and she saw D.S. over Williams’s shoulder with his arms 
around Williams as he tried to pull Williams off her. R557,594. Williams 
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threw D.S. backwards and continued to hit Victim before stopping to demand 
that the children get their things so they could leave. R557-58,654,792-93.  
The domestic violence—minor witnesses’ points of view 
 While the children played a game in the living room, they heard a loud 
slap and raised voices coming from the kitchen, with Victim calling Williams 
a cheater. R619-20,646-48,652,698,700-01. All three children ran to the kitchen 
as they heard Victim refuse Williams’s help in getting up. R620,674,697-
98,789,802. They watched the heated argument before Victim went outside 
and D.D. returned to the living room. R647-49,674-76,696,705-08. But D.S. 
noticed that the door had locked, so he unlocked the door and stayed “so 
nothing [else] would happen.” R649,663,675-76,789-90.  
 D.D. returned to see D.S. let Victim back in and the arguing between 
Victim and Williams continue. R649. Williams was mad and started 
“aggressing” on Victim, walking up to her, “puffing out his chest[,]” “flaring 
out his arms” as he walked, and claiming his innocence. R621-22,649-
50,653,664. The children watched Williams advanced on Victim, who put her 
hand to his chest and pushed him away. R622-23,664-66,674,700,790. 
Williams started egging Victim on, advancing as he raised his voice and 
taunting her to “Hit me” and “Do that again one more time[.]” R622-
23,664,680,706-07,719,791,813. D.S. had not seen Victim hit Williams, but 
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Williams kept telling her to “Do it again.” R623-24,664,680,791. Williams kept 
walking toward Victim who kept trying to push him away, pushing on and 
hitting his chest with her open hand. R624,650,680,704-05,805-06. Her hands 
slid up toward Williams’s throat, but none of the children saw Victim choke 
Williams or saw Williams struggle to breathe. R637,651,665,680-81,813. 
When, in response to Williams’s taunting, Victim hit him, the group saw 
Williams cock his arm and shoulder back and drive his fist “[f]ull force” into 
Victim’s jaw. R624-25,664,710-11,791, 820,825. He hit her again, and she fell. 
R625-26,791,821,827.  
 D.D. started yelling for Williams to stop. R681. V.G.D. had joined the 
group and started yelling and crying. R793-94,820-22. Friend struggled to 
hold V.G.D. in the hallway but could still see the events in the kitchen. R626-
27,712-13,793-94. Williams had followed Victim to the ground, knelt over her, 
and continued to hit her in the face. R626-28,678,713,791-92,821,827. D.S. 
sprang forward, bear-hugging Williams to get him off of Victim, but Williams 
threw him off and continued hitting Victim’s face. R627,678-79,714,792-93.  
When he stopped, he told the kids to get their things so they could leave. 
R628,654,681,715,792-93.  
 D.S. thought it would be safer to go to a nearby friend’s house, but D.D. 
would not leave. R628-29. D.S. and Friend left on foot but got only a block or 
-12- 
two away when Williams came after them in his truck and ordered them to 
get in. R630-32,654,682-83,794-95,807-08. All three kids said that after leaving 
Victim’s house, Williams told them that he had acted in self-defense. R634-
37,659,685,795-96. Both D.S. and D.D. noticed that Williams had “scratches 
and blood all over” his right hand. R636,685. 
The injuries 
 Victim’s injuries required specialized medical attention. R767. 
Emergency room doctors took x-rays of the injuries which revealed the need 
for a subspecialist. R766-69. So, they contacted Dr. David Stoker, an oral and 
maxillofacial surgeon, who took over Victim’s care and treatment. Id. As is 
his normal practice when developing a treatment plan for new patients 
needing immediate help, he asked her how she sustained her injuries. R767-
68. Victim stated that she had been “assaulted” “with closed fists[.]” 
R768,781.  
 His review of Victim and the x-rays revealed that both sides of her jaw 
were fractured, with the primary point of impact on the left rear of her jaw. 
R769-71. The jaw was “grossly displaced” and had lacerated the tissue inside 
the mouth above the fracture, a small piece of bone had shattered and was 
beyond repair, and a facial nerve was irreparably severed. R564-65,568,597-
99,770-73. He operated the same day, removing broken teeth and wiring 
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Victim’s jaw shut during the surgery in order to position the bones. R564,598-
99,774-75. He described the surgery as “fairly difficult” due to the degree of 
displacement on her left side. R776-77. He initially inserted four metal plates 
but ultimately operated twice more due to infections and replaced two plates 
with a single bar. R598-99,774-78. He explained that the jaw would never be 
like it had been, she would always have problems with her bite, and she 
would suffer permanent numbness of the left side of her lip, chin, and part of 
her gums. R602-05,778. When pressed by defense counsel, he acknowledged 
that it may be “possible” that the severed nerve could regenerate itself but 
that it was “exquisitely unlikely” that it would do so. R782-83. He also 
explained that her continuing problems with certain foods was due to “the 
nature of the long-term effect of the injury[.]” R784. A year after the initial 
surgery, Victim remained numb, and he put her chances of further recovery 
at “essentially none[.]” R784-85.  
The arrest 
 After gathering information at the crime scene, Officer Joshua Haskell 
located Williams at his mother’s house about an hour after Williams arrived 
home. R867-68. The officer began by asking Williams for his side of what had 
happened that night without identifying the event. R838,854. Williams first 
claimed that he had been home all night. R838,853-54. The officer then 
-14- 
arrested him, and he resisted. R637,839-46. It took two officers to effect the 
arrest, and Williams verbally abused the officers on the drive to the jail. R847-
48. Once Mirandized, he denied doing anything and claimed he had been 
“struck several times by a woman” and had left to protect himself and his 
children. R844,855,864.  
The written statements 
 After Williams’s arrest, D.S. called his mother Ex-Wife, who picked up 
all three kids and took them to her house. R637-38,688,796,814,927. Ex-Wife 
immediately notified the police that the children were witnesses and was 
given the choice of having them draft written statements or endure live 
interviews. R857-58. The kids wrote statements that same night. R638-39,688-
89,716,803,858-59.  
 D.S. wrote that Victim called Williams a cheater, that she choked and 
punched Williams, and that Williams hit her after she hit him. R652-53,638-
39,664. At trial, he explained that the written statement was “not wrong” but 
that he did not include the fact that Williams was “aggressing” on Victim, 
taunting her to hit him “again” and invading her space until she hit him. 
R621-23,652-54. He explained that  by “choke” he meant that Victim pressed 
on Williams’s chest and her hands slid up to his throat while he was 
“aggressing” on her. R638-39,652-53. But, like the other kids, he never saw 
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Williams backed against the wall with Victim’s hands around his neck, nor 
did he see Williams struggle to breathe. R637,680-81,719. He excused the 
statement’s imprecise wording because he wrote it at 1:30 a.m., he had not 
gotten any sleep, and he was “still putting things together” at the time and 
organizing what was in his head. R638-39,653,664-65.  
 D.D. wrote her statement at 3 a.m. R689. It stated that she heard Victim 
“flipped” when she saw the phone message and yelled that Williams was a 
“cheater” while she slapped and punched him. R702-03;Def. Exh. 4. Williams 
used self-defense, blocking Victim’s punch and hitting her in the jaw three 
times. R715-16;Def. Exh. 4. At trial, she said that Williams hit Victim first, 
followed her when she fell to the floor and continued hitting her in the face. 
R676-79,711,713. She explained that she used “self-defense” in her statement 
because Williams “manipulated me into writing it.” R689,719. When asked 
how, she said only that he “has his own way of manipulating people.” Id.  
 Friend wrote his statement at 4:30 a.m. while he was “really tired” and 
was bothered by having seen something “no kid wants to see.” R812-14. The 
statement reflected that Friend saw Victim’s hands on Williams’s throat as 
she hit him. R804. He explained at trial that he did not mean that she actually 
choked him but that her hands were “kind of on his throat but then most of 
it wasn’t” and that they were there for maybe five seconds.  R804. She was 
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pushing him away, and she slapped him with her open hand. R804-06. 
Williams stood his ground, and when she swung again, he explained, 
Williams blocked the swing and started hitting her. R805-06. Like the others, 
Friend never saw Williams pinned against a wall or appear to be unable to 
breathe when Victim’s hands were near his throat. R637,680-81,719,813.  
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court. 
 Williams went to trial on one count of aggravated assault (domestic 
violence), a second-degree felony [Count 1]; four counts of commission of 
domestic violence in the presence of a child, all third-degree felonies [Counts 
2-5]; driving under the influence (DUI), a class A misdemeanor; and 
interference with an arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor. R240-43. The 
jury was also instructed on the lesser-included-offense of assault and the 
lesser-included-offenses of commission of domestic violence in the presence 
of a child. R347,353-57. The instructions directed the jury that it could 
consider the greater offenses of domestic violence in the presence of a child 
only if it found Williams had committed felony aggravated assault. R763-
64,339,348-51,358. Similarly, it could consider the lesser-included-offenses of 
domestic violence in the presence of a child only if it found Williams had not 
committed the greater offenses. R763-64,347,353-57. 
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 Williams did not testify at trial but through cross examination and two 
defense witnesses maintained that from the very beginning he had claimed 
that he acted in self-defense. His questioning focused largely on establishing 
that Victim was not simply sad but was angry that night and that, per her 
history, her anger led her to physically attack him. R997-99. His mother 
testified that when Williams and his kids moved out of Victim’s house the 
first time, it was because Victim got angry, attacked Williams, and gave him 
a black eye and a bruised cheek. R909-15. When Williams again started seeing 
Victim, his mother was against it, worried that Victim would attack him 
again. R916-17,920. When Williams returned with the kids this time, he 
confirmed her fear. R920,931-33. 
 The defense also emphasized the children’s written statements, noting 
that they corroborated Williams’s version of the events, including his claims 
of self-defense, as well as what Williams’s mother said the children told her 
the night he was arrested. R925-27,935-36. Counsel attempted to establish that 
the children’s contrary trial testimony was the result of the fact that they had 
lived with Ex-Wife since the night of Williams’s arrest and she had 
manipulated their testimony in order to get custody, although the children 
denied as much. R610,642,716-17,810-12,824,908-9. In support, defense 
counsel offered a statement D.S. wrote about an unrelated matter in 2015 in 
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which D.S. claimed that Ex-Wife had given him bribes and rewards to get 
him “to attack” Williams by lying and filing false police reports. R640-41;Def. 
Exh. 3. D.S. denied actually making any false reports, and on re-direct, 
explained that when he wrote the 2015 letter, he was living with Ex-Wife, and 
Williams dictated the letter for D.S. to write so that Williams could get 
custody of D.S. and D.D. R639-41,661-62.  
 Williams also gave police a formal statement after his arrest in this case. 
R872-73,933. In it, he claimed that he acted in self-defense after Victim 
assaulted him with a phone, punched him, pinned him against a wall, and 
strangled him. R873-74,882. He showed an officer redness on his neck by his 
left ear, a scratch on his abdomen, and records from a V.A. hospital saying he 
had bruising on his larynx, scratch marks on his neck and behind his ear, 
tingling and numbness under one eye, and bruising on his head. R874-75; St. 
Exh.  22-27. Williams also had abrasions on his knuckles and fingers, mostly 
on his right hand, which he attributed to his construction work. R884-85; St. 
Exh. 13-15. Both his children disagreed, noting the scratches and blood were 
on his right hand after leaving Victim’s house. R636,685. 
 Following a two-day trial and a short deliberation, a jury rejected the 
lesser-included offenses, acquitted Williams of DUI, and convicted him of all 
other charges. R377-80;383-85. The judge sentenced him to the statutory 
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periods of commitment for each of his six convictions, running the third-
degree felonies and class B misdemeanor concurrent to each other but 
consecutive to the second-degree felony. R405-07. Williams timely appealed. 
R405-08.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Issue I. Williams claims his counsel were ineffective for not making 
various objections regarding Dr. Stoker’s testimony. But he does not prove a 
single instance of deficient performance, let alone multiple instances. And he 
has not established any prejudice.  
 First, he faults counsel for not requiring that the State lay foundation 
for Dr. Stoker’s testimony under rule 702. While counsel could have done so, 
Williams does not show that all reasonable counsel would have done so. 
Reasonable counsel could have concluded based on pre-trial discovery that 
the doctor’s testimony met the rule’s requirements without a motion. Counsel 
may also have determined that additional foundation would have increased 
the witness’ credibility and persuasiveness. And counsel may have decided 
to use his testimony to support parts of the defense by establishing that (1) 
Victim told the doctor that she got “very angry” at Williams that night, (2) 
improvement in Victim’s condition was still possible, though unlikely, and 
(3) even permanent numbness would not prevent Victim from using her 
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mouth for normal activities. Thus, on this record, Williams cannot establish 
that his counsel performed deficiently by not requiring a formal rule 702 
showing.   
 Second, Williams claims his counsel should have required the State to 
provide the doctor’s curriculum vitae. But he has not proved that it was not 
provided or that no reasonable counsel would have proceeded without it. 
Neither does he show that the resulting statutory continuance to get it would 
have resulted in a more favorable outcome. 
 Third, Williams claims that his counsel should have objected that Dr. 
Stoker opined on the ultimate issue: whether he assaulted Victim. But the 
doctor simply reported what Victim told him during treatment. Because he 
did not offer a medical opinion that the injuries resulted from an illegal 
assault, a competent attorney could decide not to object. 
 Williams also does not demonstrate prejudice for his claims. He argues 
that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s silence because without the doctor’s 
testimony there would have been insufficient evidence to prove the bodily 
injury element for each charged crime. But he has not proved either (1) a 
reasonable likelihood that any or all of the doctor’s testimony would have 
been excluded; or (2) that excluding his testimony would have changed the 
evidentiary picture enough to make a more favorable outcome reasonably 
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likely. Williams does not show that the physician could not have met rule 702 
requirements had counsel raised an objection. Even if the State did not turn 
over the doctor’s curriculum vitae, which he does not prove, the remedy 
would have been a continuance absent proof that the State acted in bad faith. 
Williams makes no effort to adduce such proof. And assuming exclusion of 
the doctor’s references to assault, Williams does not show how that exclusion 
would make a more favorable outcome reasonably likely.  
  Issue II.  Williams faults counsel for not objecting to several jury 
instructions. But Williams does not establish any flaw in the instructions or 
show that they had any effect on the outcome of his trial.  
He claims that the instruction for the lesser-included-offense of assault 
combines the elements for both class A and class B misdemeanors and 
misstates an element for the class A misdemeanor. But the instruction merely 
requires that the jury first determine that an assault occurred by finding the 
requisite “bodily injury” and then requires that the jury determine whether 
that bodily injury is “substantial,” thereby elevating the misdemeanor to a 
class A. And there can be neither deficient performance nor prejudice from 
instructing the jury that it must find that Williams’s fist striking Victim’s face 
“resulted in” rather than “caused” her injury.  
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Finally, there is no authority for Williams’s claim that prejudice be 
presumed under these circumstances. And he does not affirmatively prove 
prejudice. The jury was not prevented from considering the class A 
misdemeanor. Moreover, the jury evaluated the severity of Victim’s injury 
pursuant to a proper, unchallenged definitional instruction and found that 
she suffered serious bodily injury, making it unlikely that an instruction on 
class B misdemeanor assault would have led to a different evaluation of the 
injury and, hence, a more favorable outcome. 
 Williams also claims that the language of the self-defense instruction, 
while appropriate to his five felony convictions, omitted language that would 
allow it to be applied to the five lesser-included-offenses of assault and 
domestic violence in the presence of a child. But he cannot establish any 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome with a different self-
defense instruction because the jury’s rejection of his self-defense claim on 
the greater offenses involved the same facts at issue regarding the lesser-
included offenses. 
 Finally, none of the elements instructions for the greater and lesser 
offenses of domestic violence in the presence of a child expressly requires that 
the jury consider Williams’s self-defense claim. Williams argues that his 
counsel were ineffective for not objecting to the instructions and requiring 
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that the self-defense element be added to each. The absence of any prejudice 
argument defeats his claim.  
 In any event, he cannot establish prejudice. First, because the charges 
and the self-defense claim were based on the same facts, rejection of self-
defense for one charge makes any omission of self-defense in any other 
charge harmless. 
 Second, the instructions, as a whole, required that the jury properly 
address the self-defense issue, defeating Williams’s ineffectiveness claim. 
Domestic violence in the presence of a child requires that the jury find 
Williams committed a predicate offense of domestic violence. In this case, 
that was either aggravated assault or assault, both of which directed that the 
jury consider Williams’s self-defense claim. Thus, the instructions properly 
directed the jury to consider and reject the self-defense claim in deciding the 
predicate offense of domestic violence before considering whether that act 
occurred in the presence of a child. Nothing more was required. 
 Issue III.A.  Williams claims that his counsel were ineffective for not 
raising a hearsay objection to testimony from Officer Haskell that almost 
everyone at the crime scene told him the same thing about how the incident 
occurred and how Victim got injured. But reasonable counsel could conclude 
that a hearsay objection was not appropriate because the information was not 
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offered for the truth. The officer testified that the information came from his 
“assisting officers” and that the information and the severity of Victim’s 
injuries prompted him to track down Williams.  
 Regardless, an objection would not have changed the evidentiary 
picture enough to make a more favorable outcome reasonably likely. The 
report from assisting officers said nothing about the children’s trial testimony 
and could not, therefore, vouch for or refine that testimony, as Williams 
claims. And the officer’s brief comment is unlikely to have altered the jury’s 
perception of the discrepancies between the testimony and written 
statements of the four minors which had already been thoroughly examined 
and which factored prominently in the parties’ closing arguments. 
 Issue III.B.  Finally, Williams argues that his counsel should have 
objected to D.D.’s description of Williams as manipulative. Contrary to her 
trial testimony, D.D.’s written statement included the phrase, “He was using 
self-defen[s]e.” She explained that Williams manipulated her into writing it. 
But counsel’s silence was in keeping with their strategy, which Williams does 
not show was unreasonable. Their self-defense theory relied heavily on 
persuading the jury of the veracity of the children’s written statements which 
corroborated Williams’s self-defense claim. Counsel stressed that Williams 
was in jail when D.D. wrote hers and that any manipulation came from Ex-
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Wife’s continuing influence so she could get custody of the children. Counsel 
offered additional evidence to reinforce Ex-Wife’s manipulation. Further, the 
rules allowed D.D. to explain the discrepancy between her written statement 
and her testimony. An objection would risk exclusion of the written 
statement. Reasonable counsel could conclude that, on the whole, the defense 
was better served by not objecting to D.D.’s testimony.  
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Williams has not proven that no competent attorney 
could decide not to object to testimony from Victim’s 
facial surgeon; neither has he shown prejudice.  
 Williams argues that his trial counsel were ineffective because they did 
not object to some or all of Victim’s facial surgeon’s testimony.  First, he faults 
counsel for not objecting that the State had not met the foundational 
requirements for expert testimony under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Aplt.Br. 11-14. Second, he complains that counsel should have objected that 
the State did not provide the surgeon’s curriculum vitae prior to trial as 
required by section 77-17-13, Utah Code Ann. Id. at 17-20. Third, he argues 
that when the surgeon explained that Victim told him she was assaulted, 
defense counsel should have objected that the surgeon had opined about the 
ultimate issue. Id. at 14-17. Finally, he argues that he was prejudiced because 
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without the surgeon’s testimony, the evidence was insufficient to establish 
the bodily injury element for each of the charged crimes. Id. at 22-24.  
 To prevail, Williams must prove two elements: (1) deficient 
performance and (2) prejudice. State v. Parkinson, 2018 UT App 62, ¶9, 427 
P.3d 246 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 429 P.2d 462. To prove deficient 
performance, Williams must prove that no reasonable attorney would have 
done what his counsel did. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 
(1984). This Court’s review of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential because unlike this Court, counsel “observed the relevant 
proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the 
client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.” Id.  There are “countless 
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case” and even “the best 
criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same 
way.” Id. at 689. 
 These principles distill to this: a defendant claiming deficient 
performance must prove that “no competent attorney” would have 
proceeded as his counsel did. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011). 
 To prove prejudice, Williams must prove that “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A 
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reasonable probability is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect 
on the outcome of the proceeding.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 
(2011) (cleaned up). Rather, “[c]ounsel’s errors must be so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. 
(cleaned up). Proof of prejudice must be based on a “demonstrable reality 
and not a speculative matter.” State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) 
(cleaned up). 
 Williams has not proved deficient performance. Because the claim is 
one of ineffective assistance, the focus is not on the merits of the potential 
challenges to the surgeon’s testimony. Neither is the focus on whether 
counsel could have challenged the testimony. Rather, the issue is whether, on 
this record, all competent defense attorneys would have challenged the 
testimony’s admissibility under 702, the State’s compliance with the statutory 
notice provision for expert testimony, or the witness’ reference to Victim’s 
use of the term “assault.” The answer is no. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. See 
also Parkinson, 2018 UT App 62, ¶8 (appellate court views the substantive 
issue in an ineffective assistance claim through the lens of counsel’s 
performance). 
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 And had counsel raised the indicated objections, Williams does not 
show that any of the testimony would have been excluded or if it was, that it 
would have changed the evidentiary picture enough to make a more 
favorable outcome reasonably likely. 
A. Reasonable counsel could conclude not to file a rule 702 
motion. 
 Williams has not proved that all competent counsel would have 
insisted on a hearing to determine whether the State could show that the 
facial surgeon’s testimony met rule 702’s threshold for admissibility.2 
 Expert testimony as addressed in rule 702 “is opinion or fact testimony 
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” State v. 
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶¶11, 34, 147 P.3d 1176. Among other things, expert 
testimony will not be admitted unless it is shown that the witness is 
“qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education” and the principles and methods underlying the testimony meet a 
“threshold showing” that they are “reliable,” “based upon sufficient facts or 
data,” and “have been reliably applied to the facts.” Utah R. Evid. 702.  
                                              
2 Williams also contends that Dr. Stoker cannot be viewed as “a fact 
witness for what occurred before [Victim’s] arrival at the hospital.” Aplt.Br. 
14. But the doctor did not testify as a fact witness for events that occurred 
before he met with Victim. See subsection I.C., infra (establishing that the 
doctor referenced Victim’s explanation for how the injury occurred when 
gathering information for diagnosis and treatment). 
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 Williams says that his counsel should have objected to the treating 
surgeon’s testimony because the State did not lay this foundation before the 
surgeon testified. Aplt.Br. 12-14. He argues that his counsel permitted Dr. 
Stoker to testify about “matters beyond the realm of his expertise[,]” touching 
on radiology and biomechanical analysis without requiring that he show that 
the principles or methods underlying those fields were reliable and were 
reliably applied to the facts or data in this case. Id. at 13-14. Similarly, he 
criticizes counsel for permitting the doctor to testify in the area of his 
expertise—dental surgery or facial reconstruction—without a showing that 
the principles or methods underlying his expertise were reliable and were 
reliably applied to the facts or data in this case. Id.  
 But the issue is not whether counsel had an available rule 702 objection. 
It’s whether, on this record, all competent defense attorneys would have 
challenged the testimony’s compliance with rule 702. Williams has not 
attempted to meet that burden.  
 Nor can he establish on this record that all reasonable counsel would 
have concluded that the requirements of rule 702(b) were not or could not be 
met in this case. Instead, the foundation laid at trial for the doctor’s testimony, 
together with defense counsel’s pre-trial request for extra-record information 
about the doctor, his testing, and his anticipated testimony, strongly suggest 
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that defense counsel had sufficient information to decide to forego a rule 
702(b) objection to the surgeon’s testimony.  
 Specifically, the foundation laid at trial established that the doctor 
completed both a doctor/dental surgery degree and a residency in oral and 
maxillofacial surgery before 2009, became board certified as a surgeon and 
had a community practice at his own local private clinic, and at the time of 
trial had also been working a rotation schedule taking calls at multiple 
trauma centers around the valley handling general, oral, and maxillofacial 
surgery, including traumatic facial injuries stemming from a variety of causes 
that included assaults. R766-67. Reasonable counsel could determine from 
this foundation that a challenge to the facial surgeon’s qualifications to give 
expert opinions in the areas of general, oral and maxillofacial surgery would 
have been unlikely to succeed. 
 Further, the record suggests that defense counsel had access to extra-
record information that would have further informed them about a rule 702 
objection. They sought before trial all “reports or results of scientific tests,” 
the curriculum vitae and qualifications of all experts, written reports 
prepared by any witness, and “any tests or other specialized data” on which 
experts relied. R44-47. Counsel never complained that the State did not 
comply with the requests, the State provided defense counsel with a cd and 
-31- 
a hardcopy of Victim’s medical records five months before trial, and defense 
counsel referred at trial to Dr. Stoker’s multiple “reports” as well as other 
medical reports generated in Victim’s treatment. R129-30,779-81.  
 Thus, defense counsel had access to a wealth of record and non-record 
information about Dr. Stoker, his qualifications, and his specific handling of 
this case that would permit counsel to determine to forego a rule 702 
objection. In addition, the doctor explained that the goal of his surgery is to 
return patients to their normal functioning. R779. Reasonable counsel could 
conclude that the doctor’s years of education and expertise would necessarily 
permit him to understand sufficient aspects of other scientific areas—like 
interpreting radiologic images or understanding the biomechanical workings 
of a jaw—to permit him to know what “normal” is, to judge why something 
is no longer “normal,” and to create and implement a treatment and surgical 
plan to return it to “normal[.]” 
 Further, the foundation at trial established that the doctor had worked 
in a number of different hospitals in this area for a number of years. R766-67. 
It may well have been that one or more of Williams’s counsel or his defense 
team had prior experience with the doctor in some capacity, further 
informing a decision concerning whether to require an express rule 702(b) 
showing.    
-32- 
 Moreover, reasonable counsel could well choose not to force the State 
to lay further rule 702(b) foundation because parading further detail about 
the facial surgeon’s experience and training would only have added to his 
persuasiveness. 
  And counsel may have weighed into a calculus of whether to object to 
the surgeon’s testimony his potential usefulness to the defense. The first 
observation defense counsel made in both opening and closing, and 
repeatedly revisited, was that Victim assaulted Williams. R522-23,997-1011. 
And counsel stressed evidence establishing that when Victim got angry at 
Williams in the past, she attacked him. Id. Counsel urged the jury to find that 
she was an “angry woman” the night of the charged assault, that she 
“turn[ed] her anger into a physical assault,” and that Williams had to defend 
himself. Id. In contrast to the State’s evidence that Victim was sad but not 
angry (R589,622,1005-06), Dr. Stoker’s report established that Victim 
professed to have gotten “very angry” at Williams that night. R781.  
 And like counsel below, reasonable counsel could use the opportunity 
to mitigate the more damaging aspects of the surgeon’s testimony. For 
example, counsel elicited that Victim suffered no other injuries, that 
improvement in Victim’s condition was still possible, that the severed nerve 
could possibly but not likely regenerate, and that even if Victim suffered 
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permanent numbness, it did not prevent her from using her mouth normally. 
R779-85;894;1008-09.   
 For these reasons, Williams has not proved that no reasonable counsel 
would have foregone a rule 702 objection. On this record, the presumption of 
reasonable representation remains unrebutted, and his claim fails. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89. 
B. Williams cannot show that no curriculum vitae was provided, 
that all competent counsel would have sought one, or that an 
objection could have resulted in exclusion of the testimony. 
 Williams claims that his counsel were ineffective because they did not 
object when they did not receive Dr. Stoker’s curriculum vitae before trial. 
Aplt.Br. 17-20. This, he says, prejudicially “allow[ed] the jury to consider” the 
doctor’s testimony, he argues. Id. at 19. His claim fails for two reasons.  
 First, he offers no record support for his bald assertion that the doctor’s 
“curriculum vitae was not provided[.]” Id. In fact, the record shows that 
counsel likely received it. They clearly knew they were entitled to a copy of 
both his curriculum vitae and his written reports because they  asked for both 
in their written discovery request. R44-47. They received a timely response to 
the request, and nothing in the record demonstrates that the response was in 
any way deficient. See subsection I.A., supra. This reasonably suggests either 
that counsel received the curriculum vitae or, if not, recognized as much but 
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decided not to  pursue it, perhaps because they chose to use the doctor’s 
testimony to further the defense. See id. This defeats Williams’s claim.  
 Second, Williams has not proved that the surgeon’s testimony would 
have been excluded even if the State did not turn over the curriculum vitae. 
Exclusion would have been the remedy only if the trial court found the State 
deliberately withheld it in “bad faith.” Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13(4) 
(LexisNexis 2018) (in Add. A). Williams has not alleged bad faith, let alone 
proven it on this record. So, counsel could at most have secured a 
continuance. Id. And Williams has not argued that a continuance would have 
given the defense a strategic advantage so critical that all competent counsel 
would have taken steps to secure one.  
C. Reasonable counsel could conclude that the surgeon did not 
testify about the ultimate issue of assault, requiring no 
objection. 
 Finally, Williams contends that Dr. Stoker opined on the ultimate issue 
in this case—whether Williams assaulted Victim—and argues that counsel 
should have objected. Aplt.Br. 14-17. But Williams mischaracterizes the 
testimony so that an admissible statement Victim made in the course of her 
medical treatment appears to be an inadmissible comment on the ultimate 
issue. 
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 Williams takes the relevant references out of context, placing remarks 
that occur over the course of 5 pages into a single block quote. Id. at 15-16. 
But the testimony he omits establishes that the surgeon was merely reporting 
what Victim said to him—she was assaulted—in response to the doctor’s 
efforts to obtain information necessary to her diagnosis and treatment. As 
such, it was admissible at trial. See Utah R. Evid. 803(4)(A) & (B) (a statement 
is admissible as non-hearsay if it “is made for—and is reasonably pertinent 
to – medical diagnosis or treatment;” and “describes medical history; past or 
present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause”). See 
also Lemmon v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co, 341 P.2d 215, 218 (Utah 1959) (treating 
physician can testify to the patient’s statements about symptoms and history; 
an expert may discuss information relied on in forming an opinion). 
 Placed back in context, the remarks were explained the first time they 
occurred. On direct examination, the prosecutor established that when Dr. 
Stoker responded to the call from the hospital, he met with Victim.  
 Q (prosecutor).   And did you ask her about how she 
sustained her injuries? 
 A.    I do. I will generally will [sic] ask the patient how they 
sustained the injury. The mechanism of injury is often of some 
importance to us to help as we formulate a treatment plan for the 
patient to know what injuries we might be looking for. 
 Q.    And based on your interaction with her, what was your 
understanding of how she sustained her injury? 
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 A.    That she was assaulted, to my understanding, with 
closed fists by an assailant. 
 Q.    And why did knowing that—why was that important 
for you in diagnosing her? 
 A.    The mechanism of injury can be important given the 
type of fractures and the number of fractures that we will look 
for. 
R767-68 (in Add. B).  Thus, the term “assaulted” came from Victim’s report 
given in the course of medical assessment and treatment. Such a use is 
entirely appropriate. See Lemmon, 341 P.2d at 218. Moreover, the reference did 
not tie the assault to Williams. 
 Other references to variations of “assault” occurred thereafter (see Add. 
B). Dr. Stoker explained that in cases “like an assault[,]” a blow is delivered 
“sideways” with enough force that it could break a jaw in two places. R770. 
Still later, the prosecutor asked the doctor where the “primary point of 
impact” occurred based on what Victim said and what he learned from his 
own assessment. R770-71. The doctor believed the point of impact was the 
back left part of Victim’s jaw because that’s where the “greater displacement” 
is and, as most “assailants” are right handed, the impact will commonly occur 
on the patient’s left side. R771. And later, when the prosecutor asked “what 
kind of force” it would take to cause the damage Victim suffered, the doctor 
responded, “Blunt force trauma like this in an assault. It takes a considerable 
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amount of force.” R773. Read in light of the initial explanation, each of these 
remarks simply uses a form of “assault” as originally used by Victim: as a 
colloquial substitute for “hit.”  
 Defense counsel understood this use and reinforced it on cross-
examination for the jury’s benefit. Counsel produced a copy of Dr. Stoker’s 
report that was generated “in the course of [Victim’s] treatment” and asked 
him specific questions about its contents. R780-81 (Add. B).  
 Q (defense counsel). …So do you find the section where—of 
your report that—I believe it’s entitled “History of Present 
Illness”? 
 A.    Yes, Ma’am. I see it here. 
 Q.    And that’s what you are talking about when you talk 
about the information that you received from [Victim] about 
how her injury occurred; am I correct about that? 
 A.    Correct. And to a degree there’s oftentimes overlap. 
With the admitting physicians, we use their reports as well. 
 Q.     Okay. And one of the things that she indicated is that 
she’s not clear if she lost consciousness or not; correct? 
 A.     Correct. That’s what I noted, yes. 
 Q.    And what’s also indicated in there is that she reportedly 
discovered her boyfriend cheating on her; correct? 
 A.    Correct. Yes. 
 Q.    And subsequently, he assaulted her? 
 A.    Yes. 
Id.  
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 Thus, viewed in context, the doctor’s use of “assault” to describe the 
blow that inflicted Victim’s injuries was not a medical or legal opinion but 
simply a recognition of Victim’s use of that term to describe the source of her 
injuries so he could conduct an assessment and formulate a treatment plan. 
As such, it was admissible under rule 803(4), Utah Rules of Evidence. See State 
v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222-24 (Utah 1986)(psychiatrist’s testimony 
about patient’s statements of his history “came well within” rule 803(4)). The 
terminology was not argued by either party to mean anything else. Thus, 
reasonable counsel could conclude that no objection was necessary. 
D.  Williams has not proved prejudice. 
 Williams argues that his counsel’s silence in the face of Dr. Stoker’s 
testimony was prejudicial because “[a]bsent David Stoker’s testimony, the 
evidence was insufficient” to support his convictions because the jury would 
be unable to distinguish “between bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, 
and serious bodily injury.” Aplt.Br. 22-24.  
 The proper test, however, is whether there is a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for Williams had his counsel raised the issues he 
has identified. See State v. Cantarero, 2018 UT App 204, ¶13; Parkinson, 2018 
UT App 62, ¶¶9, 12. To prove that, Williams must prove both (1) a reasonable 
probability that an objection would have succeeded, and (2) that the 
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successful objection would have changed the evidentiary picture enough to 
make a more favorable outcome reasonably likely. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 
477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). Williams has not met this burden.  
 First, Williams has not proved a reasonable likelihood that Dr. Stoker 
could not have been qualified as an expert had defense counsel required on-
the-record proof of compliance with rule 702(b). See Salt Lake City v. San Juan, 
2015 UT App 157, 353 P.3d 623 (prejudice not established for counsel’s alleged 
failure to object to admitting officer’s alleged expert testimony where 
defendant did not show a reasonable likelihood that officer would not have 
qualified as expert).  In fact, the record evidence is to the contrary. See 
subsection I.A., supra.  
 Second, had counsel objected to the doctor’s references to assaultive 
behavior, only those references would have been excluded. Not only is that 
testimony irrelevant to the prejudice Williams claims, but its absence is not 
reasonably likely to have produced a more favorable outcome for Williams 
in light of the remainder of the doctor’s testimony that would remain before 
the jury.  
 Finally, as previously stated, had counsel informed the trial court that 
it had not been given the doctor’s curriculum vitae, counsel would have 
received a continuance to obtain the document. See subsection I.B., supra. He 
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does not show that a continuance would have led to information that would 
have altered the admissibility of the doctor’s testimony.  
 Accordingly, Williams has not shown that any objection to Dr. Stoker’s 
testimony would have succeeded in excluding any of his testimony. Even if 
it had, it is unlikely to have changed the evidentiary picture. Victim testified 
about her injuries, the extensive treatment they required, and the lasting 
effects as of trial. This evidence, together with the jury instruction detailing 
the bodily injury definitions, would have permitted the jury to differentiate 
between the types of bodily injury, making a more favorable outcome 
unlikely absent the doctor’s testimony. R340. Thus, Williams’s ineffectiveness 
claims as to the doctor’s testimony fail. See Parkinson, 2018 UT App 62, ¶9 
(failure to prove prejudice defeats an ineffective assistance claim). 
II. 
The claimed instructional errors did not constitute 
deficient performance, and none were reasonably 
likely to have affected the trial’s outcome. 
 Williams argues that his trial counsel were ineffective because they did 
not object to several jury instructions. He first  faults the lack of an objection 
to both an allegedly flawed instruction for the lesser-included-offense of 
assault and to a narrow self-defense instruction. Aplt.Br. 24-37. He says that 
the result of the former is that the jury was unable to consider the lesser-
included-offense of assault, while the result of the latter was that the jury 
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could not apply his self-defense claim to any of the lesser-included-offenses. 
Id. at 29-31,33.  
 He then argues that his counsel should have objected to the elements 
instructions for the multiple counts of domestic violence in the presence of a 
child. Id. at 37-42. He maintains that the instructions misstate the law because 
they do not include a requirement that the jury find he did not act in self-
defense. Id. 
 Again, Williams must prove both elements of Strickland. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687-88, 697; State v. McHugh, 2011 UT App 62, ¶4, 250 P.3d 1006. Jury 
instructions that correctly state the law require no objection. State v. Lee, 2014 
UT App 4, ¶22, 318 P.3d 1164. This Court views the instructions “’in their 
entirety’” to determine whether they “’fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case.’” State v. Painter, 2014 UT App 272, ¶6, 339 P.3d 107 
(quoting State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶148, 299 P.3d 892 (cleaned up)).   
 And “even when a jury instruction is erroneous, the error may 
nevertheless be harmless[.]”  See State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ¶¶24-28, 285 
P.3d 1183. Proof of prejudice “must be a demonstrable reality,” not mere 
speculation.  Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993).  Errors that have 
an “isolated” or “trivial effect” on the verdict are not prejudicial.  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 695-96. Even erroneous affirmative-defense instructions can be 
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harmless given the evidence.  See State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 91-92 (Utah 1981) 
(error in self-defense instruction was harmless under facts); Lee, 2014 UT App 
4, ¶¶28-33 (error in imperfect self-defense instruction was harmless under 
facts). 
 Here, Williams’s claims fail because he cannot establish deficient 
performance where the instructions as a whole properly instruct the jury, he 
urges this Court to presume prejudice where no presumption is available, 
and he does not otherwise establish prejudice. 
A. The misdemeanor assault instruction proffered by defense 
counsel allowed the jury to consider the lesser offense, and any 
error did not affect the trial’s outcome. 
 The trial judge used defense counsel’s proposed jury instruction 
detailing the lesser-included-offense of “assault, domestic violence.” 
R289,347.  That instruction required, in relevant part, proof that Williams 
4. Committed an act, with unlawful force or violence, that caused 
bodily injury to another; and, 
4. That resulted in substantial bodily injury to another…. 
R347 (Jury Instr. 28) (in Add. C).  
 Williams claims that this instruction suffers from two problems. First, 
he asserts that the first of the above elements pertains to class B misdemeanor 
assault while the second pertains to class A misdemeanor assault. Aplt.Br. 24-
28. The extra element, he argues, effectively combines the elements for a class 
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A and a class B misdemeanor into a single instruction, robbing him of a 
“proper instruction” as to either class of misdemeanor. Id. at 28-29. Second, 
he explains, the element for the class A misdemeanor is misstated, using the 
term “resulted in” instead of the statutory term “caused.” Id. at 28. The result 
of these errors, he claims, was to prevent the jury “as a matter of law” from 
convicting him of the lesser-included-offense of assault. Id. at 29. 
 Williams does not claim that a class A misdemeanor instruction was 
inappropriate or that he was entitled to a class B misdemeanor instruction. 
See State v. Wilkinson, 2017 UT App 204, ¶26, 407 P.3d 1045 (rejecting assertion 
that counsel is deficient by not requesting every lesser included offense 
available). He argues only that neither was properly defined in the 
instruction.  
 But the instruction permitted the jury to convict Williams of class A 
misdemeanor assault. Assault is statutorily defined as “an act, committed 
with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another or creates 
a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.” Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102(1)(b) 
(LexisNexis 2018) (in Add. A). This is what the first #4 element required: 
commission of “an act, with unlawful force or violence, that caused bodily 
injury to another[.]” R347. If that was all the jury was required to find, it could 
convict him of a class B misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102(1)(2). But 
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the instruction required that the jury find more. The very next requirement 
was that the bodily injury be “substantial.” R347. An assault is a class A 
misdemeanor if the bodily injury caused by the assault is “substantial bodily 
injury[.]” Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102(3)(a). Thus, a finding by the jury of all of 
the listed elements would support a conviction for class A misdemeanor 
assault. 
 Further, use of the phrase “resulted in substantial bodily injury” 
instead of the statutory language of “causes substantial bodily injury” is a 
difference without a meaning. The charged act was Williams striking Victim’s 
face with his fist. Whether his use of his fist “caused” the injury or “resulted 
in” the injury is a matter of semantics; Williams could have suffered no 
prejudice from the substitution of one term for the other under these facts.  
 Williams further argues that this Court should presume prejudice from 
the misdemeanor instruction because an error in instructing on the “basic 
elements” of the lesser-included-offense of assault can never be harmless. Id. 
at 35-36. Even if the instruction was erroneous, this argument would fail as it 
has been conclusively rejected in Utah. See State v. Garcia,  2017 UT 53, ¶¶34-
48, 424 P.3d 171 (rejecting claim that prejudice may be assumed for 
ineffectiveness claim based on erroneous instruction on lesser-included 
offense which was submitted by defense counsel); Parkinson, 2018 UT App 
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62, ¶¶10-11 (“Prejudice is not shown automatically nor is it presumed in jury 
instruction errors attributable to counsel’s deficient performance”)(cleaned 
up). A defendant’s burden to establish a “reasonable probability that the jury 
would have returned a more favorable verdict…if properly instructed” is 
well-settled. See, e.g., Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ¶¶26-33 (requiring affirmative 
showing of prejudice in addition to proof of deficient performance for not 
objecting to erroneous instruction).  
 Thus, Williams must affirmatively prove prejudice and he cannot. He 
claims prejudice because the allegedly improper instruction rendered the 
lesser-included-offense of assault a “legally unavailable option” which “as a 
matter of law” the jury could not consider. Aplt.Br. 29, 35-37. But, as 
explained, the jury was not prevented from considering and convicting him 
of a class A misdemeanor. See Wilkinson, 2017 UT App 204, ¶30 (recognizing 
jury could have convicted defendant of lesser offense despite fact the 
instruction improperly stated the crime’s elements and “would have been 
incapable of supporting a conviction”). Further, had the jury found that the 
State had proved nothing more than the elements of class B misdemeanor, 
the instruction as written would have required an acquittal, to Williams’s 
benefit. 
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 And Williams cannot show that an instruction for class B misdemeanor 
assault is reasonably likely to have resulted in a more favorable outcome. The 
jury was properly instructed as to the bodily injury definitions, evaluated 
Victim’s injury, and determined that she had suffered serious bodily injury. 
R339-40,383. There is no reasonable likelihood that submission of an 
instruction on Class B misdemeanor assault would have prompted any 
different evaluation of Victim’s injury, making a more favorable outcome 
improbable.  
 Because the instruction, as written, permitted the jury to consider the 
lesser-included-offense of class A misdemeanor assault and Williams cannot 
show a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome had counsel 
objected to the instruction, his claim fails. See Wilkinson, 2017 UT App 204, 
¶¶29-31, & n.4 (defense counsel’s submission of erroneous lesser-included-
offense elements instruction was not prejudicial where it had no effect on the 
trial’s outcome). 
B. Williams’s failure to make a prejudice argument defeats his 
challenge to the self-defense instruction; regardless, any error 
in the instruction is necessarily harmless. 
 Williams also argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the 
self-defense instruction given to the jury. Aplt.Br. 31-33. That instruction 
provides, in part, “you are instructed that a person is justified in using force 
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likely to cause serious bodily injury only if the person reasonably believes 
that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the 
person.” R343 (Jury Instr. 25, in Add. C),903. Williams does not fault this 
language and concedes that this provision is appropriate for the five felony 
charges. Aplt.Br. 32-33. See Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2016) 
(in Add. A). 
 But he argues that the instruction prejudicially narrows the application 
of the affirmative defense by omitting any reference to the language in 
subsection (1)(a) of the self-defense statute: “threatening or using force 
against another” when he “reasonably believes that force or a threat of force 
is necessary to defend the person” against the “imminent use of unlawful 
force.” Aplt.Br. 32-33. See Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(1)(a). In other words, he 
claims that the instruction, as written, applies to the felony offenses with 
which he was charged because they involve “death or serious bodily injury” 
but not to any of the lesser-included offenses on which the jury was 
instructed. Aplt.Br. 32-33. Williams argues that this prevented the jury from 
considering his self-defense claim for the lesser-included offenses and 
rendered his counsel’s performance deficient. Id.  
 Although Williams carries the burden of affirmatively establishing 
both elements of his ineffective assistance claim, he has not argued how the 
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challenged self-defense instruction prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-
88, 697; McHugh, 2011 UT App 62, ¶4 (“defendant must show both deficient 
performance and prejudice” to establish an ineffectiveness claim) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). He claims that the jury “could not apply self-
defense” to several charges, but he does not assert that, had counsel objected 
and a different instruction been given, there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury would have acquitted him of those charges. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687. His claim fails for this reason alone. Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 
2000 UT 98, ¶7, 17 P.3d 1122 (defendant’s “[f]ailure to provide any analysis 
or legal authority” on the issue of prejudice “constitutes inadequate briefing” 
that this Court cannot and will not review); State v. Smith, 2012 UT App 338, 
¶18, 291 P.3d 869 (refusing to conduct review for ineffective assistance absent 
an argument on either requirement).  
 Williams could not meet his burden in any event. The jury found that 
the State had disproved self-defense when it convicted him of aggravated 
assault and the remaining greater offenses, and Williams does not contest the 
self-defense instruction’s application to those offenses. R339,343,348-51,383-
85. All of the lesser-included offenses are based on the same facts. Because 
the jury rejected self-defense on the greater offenses on the same facts that 
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applied to the lesser, omitting language from the instruction for offenses not 
involving death or serious bodily injury did not harm Williams. 
C. Omitting lack of self-defense as an element of the domestic 
violence in the presence of a child charges was neither 
deficient nor prejudicial because the instructions as a whole 
correctly instructed the jury on self-defense.3 
 In a related claim, Williams argues that his counsel were ineffective for 
not objecting to jury instructions 29-32 (R348-51) and 34 (R353), which 
address the elements of the four counts of domestic violence in the presence 
of a child as both greater and lesser offenses.4 Aplt.Br. 37-42. He maintains 
that because he claimed self-defense at trial, the elements instructions for all 
of the charged crimes must expressly tell the jury that before it can convict on 
any one of them, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act 
in self-defense. Id. at 39-42. And because the elements instructions for 
aggravated assault and assault include this directive while the remaining 
offenses do not, he argues, the jury received inconsistent messages that 
allowed it “to conclude that self-defense did not apply” to the domestic 
                                              
3 This argument responds to Point III of Williams’s brief. Aplt.Br. 37-
42. 
4 Williams appears to intend to include all of the lesser-included-
offense counts involving domestic violence in the presence of a child. Aplt.Br. 
40. Those instructions span instructions 34 through 38, but only instruction 
34 sets out the elements. R353-57 (in Add. C). 
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violence charges. Id. at 40-41. He argues that counsel should have objected to 
these instructions so as “to maintain the consistency of the … wording.” Id. 
at 42.  
 As before, Williams’s challenge fails because he makes no attempt to 
meet his burden of proving prejudice. See Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ¶¶22-25 
(requiring proof of prejudice for counsel’s deficient performance in not 
objecting to instruction improperly stating burden of proving imperfect self-
defense); Smith, 2012 UT App 338, ¶18.  
 In any event, he cannot do so. First, because self-defense was based on 
the same facts for all of the charges, the jury’s rejection of it for one charge 
would render harmless any omission of it in any other charge.  
 Second, Williams cannot establish that his counsel’s performance was 
constitutionally ineffective because the jury instructions, taken as a whole, 
adequately and appropriately addressed self-defense in relation to all of the 
charged offenses. See State v. Ojeda, 2015 UT App 124, 350 P.3d 640 (jury 
instructions are to be considered as a whole); Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ¶¶26-33 (no 
deficiency so long as the instructions as a whole constitute “a correct 
statement of the law”).  
 Williams was charged with aggravated assault and four counts of 
domestic violence in the presence of a child. Aggravated assault was the 
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predicate offense for all four of the other counts—it was the act of domestic 
violence that was alleged to have been committed in the presence of the 
children. Thus, the jury was instructed that it must find that Williams 
committed aggravated assault in order to find him guilty of committing any 
of the other four offenses. R358 (Jury Instr. 38a in Add. C). And as instructed, 
the jury had to find that Williams did not act in self-defense when he 
committed the aggravated assault. R339. So, when the jury used aggravated 
assault as the predicate act of domestic violence for the greater offenses of 
domestic violence in the presence of a child, it had already considered and 
rejected Williams’s self-defense claim. 
 Similarly, Williams was charged with the lesser-included-offense of 
assault together with four lesser-included-offenses of domestic violence in 
the presence of a child. Assault was the predicate offense for all four of the 
lesser domestic violence offenses. Thus, the jury was instructed that it could 
only convict of the lesser-included offenses if it found he did not commit the 
greater offenses. R354-357 (Jury Instr. 35-38). And the jury had to find that he 
did not act in self-defense when he committed assault. R347. So, had the jury 
used assault as the predicate act of domestic violence for the lesser domestic 
violence offenses, it would have already considered and rejected Williams’s 
self-defense claim. 
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 Thus, including lack of self-defense as an element in the greater and 
lesser charges of domestic violence in the presence of a child would be 
redundant: the jury only had to reject self-defense once. See, e.g., Ojeda, 2015 
UT App 124, ¶6 (no ineffective assistance for not objecting to absence of a 
redundant element from an instruction). Williams therefore establishes 
neither deficient performance nor prejudice, and his claim fails. See Painter, 
2014 UT App 272, ¶¶4-12 (absence of self-defense as element of aggravated 
assault instruction neither deficient nor prejudicial where other instructions 
properly stated the law); Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ¶¶22-25 (rejecting 
ineffectiveness claim that murder instruction not containing “element” that 
jury must find lack of self-defense led jury to convict without self-defense 
determination).  
III. 
Williams has not proven that no competent attorney 
could decide not to object to testimony from either the 
investigating officer or Williams’s daughter. 
 Williams makes two final ineffective assistance claims. First, he argues 
that his trial counsel should have made a hearsay objection to testimony from 
an investigating officer that explained what he discovered at the crime scene 
concerning Victim’s injuries. Aplt.Br. 42-43. But reasonable counsel could 
conclude that a hearsay objection was inappropriate because the officer’s 
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testimony was non-hearsay evidence admitted to explain the officer’s 
conduct. 
 Second, Williams claims his trial counsel should have objected to or 
moved to strike his daughter’s testimony that he “manipulated” her to get 
her to write in her pre-trial statement that he acted in self-defense. Id. at 43-
45. He argues that the testimony was inadmissible character evidence and 
that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel not to object. Id. at 45. 
But reasonable counsel could conclude that it was more beneficial to the 
defense to get D.D.’s written statement in and shift the “manipulation” label 
to Ex-Wife than to object. 
A.  Williams has not proved that no reasonable counsel could 
have concluded that the officer’s testimony was offered for 
purposes other than showing that the statements were true; 
any potential impact was miniscule. 
 Williams has not proved that all reasonable counsel would have made 
a hearsay objection to certain testimony from Officer Joshua Haskell. See 
Premo, 562 U.S. at 124.  
 Williams objects to the following emphasized statements: 
 Q (by prosecutor). Well, at some point did – in speaking 
with your other officers and your own inquiries with the people 
involved, did you find a suspect of what caused – did you form 
a belief on why [Victim] was injured? 
 A (Officer Haskell). I was told by almost everyone on scene that 
the reason why the incident took place was [Victim] had discovered that 
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the suspect in this case, Steven Williams, was cheating on her and she 
found out. She said that she found out and confronted him about it and 
I think even text the other girl and that’s what made him upset, and 
that’s the reason why the incident took place. 
 Q.    And based on your – the information you received from 
those folks and your other assisting officers, how did she get 
hurt? 
 A.    I was told that he – I believe this is verbatim too, “cold-cock 
punched her in the face.” 
R834-35 (emphasis added) (in Add. D). Williams criticizes the emphasized 
testimony as being inadmissible hearsay evidence that did not fit within an 
exception to the rule against hearsay. Aplt.Br. 43.  
 But reasonable counsel could have come to the opposite conclusion 
because, as shown by the remainder of the quoted exchange, the testimony 
was offered to explain why Officer Haskell pursued his investigation.  
 Q.   Okay. And so based on that, did you attempt to locate 
Mr. Williams?  
 A.   Yeah. Yeah. At that point, I tried to determine where he 
would have gone, if he had any other known addresses, stuff like 
that. 
 Q.   Okay. And why did you feel that that was necessary?  
 A.   Due to the extensive injuries, I knew that – it was more 
– it was entering the realm of criminal rather than just, there’s a 
little altercation between two people. You’ve seriously hurt this 
person. I want to at least talk to you and get your side of the 
story, and that’s what I attempted to do. 
R835.  
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 Hearsay is an “out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted[.]” State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ¶44, 302 P.3d 844. But 
an out-of-court statement that is “offered for some other purpose” and not 
for its truth is not hearsay. See Arnold v. Grigsby, 2018 UT 14, ¶22, 417 P.3d 606 
(statement not proscribed by hearsay rule when offered to show the effect on 
the hearer, not for the truth of the matters asserted in the statement); State v. 
Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1987)(officer's testimony regarding 
conversation with informant was not hearsay because it was admitted to 
explain the officer's conduct); see also State v. Dodge, 2008 UT App 36U, *1 
(statement offered to explain chronology of events and conduct of officers 
was admissible as non-hearsay testimony); State in re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85  
(Utah App. 1998) (out-of-court statements about which caseworker testified 
were admissible because they were meant to explain her actions, not to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted); Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Utah 
App. 1987)(officer's testimony about his conversation with a store clerk was 
admissible to explain the officer's conduct).  
 Whether the officer’s statements were truthful was irrelevant. What 
was important was the part they played in the investigation. Reasonable 
counsel could conclude that the statements were not offered as evidence of 
what Williams actually did to Victim or what the children claimed he had 
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done. As Haskell stated, the information came from his “assisting officers” 
who gathered it while he was preoccupied with Victim, and it was part of 
what led him to track down and arrest Williams. R833-36. As such, a 
reasonable counsel could conclude that the statements were not 
objectionable. See Dodge, 2008 UT App 36U, *2 (no ineffective assistance for 
not making hearsay objection to statement of Dodge’s location where 
statement was offered to explain police conduct and, therefore, was not 
hearsay).  
 Williams’s prejudice argument is equally unpersuasive. He claims that 
the officer’s testimony concerning “almost everyone on the scene” allowed 
him to “restate and refine” the “disjointed” and “contradictory” trial 
testimony of the four children. Aplt.Br. 43. But the officer’s testimony said 
nothing about the children’s trial testimony. He summarized only what other 
officers told him the children had told them at the scene. And again, the 
testimony did not vouch for, restate, or refine the children’s testimony 
because it only explained what prompted Williams’s arrest.  
 Moreover, any possible impact his brief testimony may have had on 
the jury’s perception of the children’s testimony was miniscule given the 
discrepancies already established between the written and in-court versions 
of events recounted by the four young eyewitnesses.  Far from “effectively 
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remov[ing]” any doubt arising from the discrepancies (Aplt.Br. 43), the 
officer’s brief overview of how and why Victim was injured contained too 
little information factored through other officers to explain or otherwise 
ameliorate the discrepancies in the children’s later reports and trial 
testimony. And those discrepancies factored prominently in the parties’ 
closing remarks while the officer’s testimony did not. R981-85,1002,1009-10.  
Where the jury heard the testimony of the four children, the discrepancies 
identified by counsel, the explanations offered by the children, and the 
characterization of those matters in closing arguments, then took at least one 
written statement into deliberations, there is no reasonable likelihood that, 
absent the officer’s statements, the jury would have reached a more favorable 
decision for Williams.  
B. Williams has not proved that no reasonable counsel could have 
concluded not to object to his daughter’s testimony. 
 Finally, Williams argues that his trial counsel should have objected  
that D.D.’s characterization of Williams as “manipulative” was improper 
character evidence. Aplt.Br. 43-45. But reasonable counsel could have chosen 
not to object. 
 At trial, D.D. testified that before she saw Williams hit Victim in the 
face, she saw Victim put her hands on Williams’s chest and push him but not 
choke him. R680-81. Williams kept taunting her and trying to invade her 
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space but did not seem to lose his breath. Id. When Victim later walked in 
through the back door, D.D. said that Williams walked up to Victim and hit 
her in the face. R676-77,710-11.  
 The prosecutor handed D.D. the statement she said she had written at 
3 a.m. after being awake a “long time.” R688-89. The statement reflected in 
capital letters that Williams “was using self-defen[s]e.” Def. Exh. 4. When 
asked why she wrote that, she responded 
A. Because he [Williams] manipulated me into writing it. 
Q. How did he do that? 
A. He had his own way of manipulating people. 
Q. Were you—did you feel like you had to write that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why? 
A. I do not know. 
 
R689.  
 On cross-examination, defense counsel addressed the written 
statement at length, using it to support the defense by highlighting parts of 
the statement that suggested that Victim was the aggressor, establishing that 
D.D. believed when she wrote it that Williams was acting in self-defense, 
stressing that D.D. wrote it while living with Ex-Wife, and emphasizing that 
D.D. and Ex-Wife have talked about the incident since D.D. wrote the 
statement. R690,701-03,715-17. The prosecutor thereafter returned to the self-
defense discrepancy: 
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 Q.    Now, you indicated that at the moment you wrote this 
you thought your dad was using self-defense; is that accurate? 
 A.    Yes. 
 Q.    Why did you think he was using self-defense when you 
wrote this statement? 
 A.    Because he manipulated me into saying it and I was also 
raised by him saying that he always uses self-defense by—when 
people, like, hit him or—I don’t know, like he was just trying—




 Williams proposes that the State used the manipulation terminology to 
suggest that he acted in conformity with that trait by manipulating what his 
daughter put in her written statement, implying that what she wrote was a 
lie. Id. at 44. This prejudiced him, he claims, because it undermined the 
defense before it could present its arguments to the jury. Id. at 45. He states 
that there could be no “conceivable tactical basis” that would justify 
admission of that characterization. Id.  
 But counsel’s conduct was in keeping with their trial strategy. Williams 
must, but cannot, show that the strategy was unreasonable. The defense 
theory was one of self-defense, and defense counsel emphasized the fact that 
Williams claimed self-defense from the very start. See Aplt.Br. 45. R1002. 
Counsel relied heavily on the children’s written statements in cross-
examination, using them to establish that shortly after the altercation, all of 
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the children corroborated Williams’s explanation that Victim hit, punched 
and slapped him and that Williams had acted in self-defense. R999,1002-04 
(defense closing argument). Counsel argued that the written statements 
“corroborate a lot of what [Williams] said” and that he could not have 
manipulated what they wrote because he was in jail at that time. R1003.  
 At the same time, defense counsel also challenged the credibility of the 
children’s trial testimony by highlighting the differences between that 
testimony and their earlier written statements, urging the jury to credit the 
written statements, and blaming the differing trial testimony on Ex-Wife’s 
influence. Aplt.Br. 45. R1003. Counsel explained that Williams’s kids had 
lived with Ex-Wife since the night of the assault, that Ex-Wife “doesn’t even 
like” Williams, and that she “wants to use this event to try to get custody of 
the kids.” R1003.  
 This theory explains why defense counsel remained silent when D.D. 
suggested she had been manipulated. They wanted to emphasize that the 
children first reported that Williams was defending himself. They could not 
get that part of the statement in and keep the State from letting D.D. explain 
why she changed her testimony. And they had a way to shift the 
“manipulation” label to Ex-Wife. The children had lived with her since the 
night of the incident, and she wanted custody, which they presented as a 
-61- 
motive for her to manipulate the children into changing their story for trial. 
R610,642, 716,810,908-09. They also offered evidence to establish that Ex-Wife 
had previously manipulated D.S. to lie about his father. R639-41,667-68; Def. 
Exh. 3.  
 Further, when D.D. first used the word, it sounded oddly mature for 
the witness, and she could not explain what she meant. R689. Defense counsel 
thereafter used the last question asked of D.D. to play on the incongruity of 
the word and to plant in the jury’s mind exactly what they wanted the jury 
to believe: that while preparing D.D. for trial, Ex-Wife used that word to 
describe Williams’s behavior. R720. Despite D.D.’s denial that Ex-Wife 
suggested the word to her, the seed was planted, and the jury could consider 
it along with earlier evidence counsel had adduced that Ex-Wife had, in the 
past, “interfered with” and “used” D.S. to make false claims against Williams. 
Def. Exh. 3. 
 Additionally, reasonable counsel could conclude that in order to get 
the statement in, they could not object when D.D. tried to explain it. In fact, 
the rules would have allowed the explanation. See Utah R. Evid. 613(b). 
Reasonable counsel could also conclude that an objection might be seen by 
the jury as further evidence of Williams’s attempt to manipulate her 
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testimony. See State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ¶38, 354 P.3d 791 (discussing 
reasons for not objecting to an improper closing argument).  
 Reasonable counsel could conclude that on the whole, the defense was 
better off getting the statement in and presenting evidence that it was more 
likely that Ex-Wife manipulated D.D. than to risk having the statement 
excluded to prevent D.D. from accusing Williams of manipulating her, 
especially where D.D. could not detail how Williams actually manipulated 
her or explain how he could have manipulated her after he was arrested. And 
with the statement in, they could argue that, like the other children, D.D.’s 
first report—that Williams was only defending himself—was more likely to 
be true than her trial testimony. See id. at ¶¶37-40 (ineffective assistance claim 
based on lack of objection fails given possible strategic reasons).  
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm all of Williams’s 
convictions. 
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 Respectfully submitted on April 17, 2019. 
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